Assessing the sustainability of pension reforms in Europe by Grech, Aaron George
i 
 
Assessing the sustainability of pension reforms in Europe 
 
Aaron George Grech 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.  State pensions in Europe and their changing role ........................................................... 3 
2.  Defining and measuring pension system sustainability .................................................. 9 
(a)  Achievement of System Goals ....................................................................................... 13 
(b)  Pressure on System Constraints ..................................................................................... 13 
3.  Applying empirically the pension system sustainability framework ............................ 14 
4.  Overall assessment of social sustainability of pension reforms.................................... 20 
5.  Policy considerations .................................................................................................... 25 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE/140 Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
September 2010  London School of Economics 
 Houghton Street 
 London WC2A 2AE 
 CASE enquiries – tel: 020 7955 6679 
ii 
 
Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion 
 
The Centre for the Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) is a multi-disciplinary 
research centre based at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), within the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and 
Related Disciplines (STICERD). Our focus is on exploration of different dimensions 
of social disadvantage, particularly from longitudinal and neighbourhood perspectives, 
and examination of the impact of public policy. 
 
In addition to our discussion paper series (CASEpapers), we produce occasional 
summaries of our research in CASEbriefs, and reports from various conferences and 
activities in CASEreports. All these publications are available to download free from 
our website. Limited printed copies are available on request.  
 
For further information on the work of the Centre, please contact the Centre Manager, 
Jane Dickson, on: 
 
Telephone:  UK+20 7955 6679 
Fax:  UK+20 7955 6951 
Email:  j.dickson@lse.ac.uk 
Web site: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/case 
 
 
 
 
 Aaron George Grech 
 
All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be 
quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including  notice, is 
given to the source. 
 
 
iii 
 
Editorial Notes and Acknowledgements 
Aaron George Grech is an Economic Advisor at the Department for Work and 
Pensions (UK). This paper summarises the main results of the doctoral research he 
carried out between September 2006 and May 2010 at the LSE‟s Centre for Analysis 
of Social Exclusion (CASE), where he is now a Visiting Research Fellow. For the 
work reported here, he is grateful to his principal supervisor, John Hills, for his ideas, 
criticism, constant attention, discipline and enthusiasm shown throughout his period 
as a PhD student affiliated to CASE. The paper also benefits from the comments of his 
associate supervisor, Nicholas Barr, whose research helped inspire the social 
sustainability concept developed by the author to assess pension reforms. This 
research would not have been possible in the absence of the excellent pension 
modelling work conducted by the OECD in recent years, and the author is particularly 
indebted to Monika Queisser and Edward Whitehouse, of the OECD‟s Social Policy 
Division, for having granted him access to the OECD‟s APEX model. The author also 
thanks CASE for providing accommodation and computing facilities and the LSE 
Department of Social Policy for academic guidance during his doctoral research.  
 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and organisations with 
which he is affiliated with do not carry any responsibility towards data used and 
interpretations made in the paper. The author also takes full responsibility for all 
errors and omissions.   
 
 
iv 
 
Abstract 
Spurred by the ageing transition, many governments have made wide-ranging reforms, 
dramatically changing Europe‟s pensions landscape. Nevertheless there remain 
concerns about future costs, while unease about adequacy is growing. This study 
develops a comprehensive framework to assess pension system sustainability. It 
captures the effects of reforms on the ability of systems to alleviate poverty and 
maintain living standards, while setting out how reforms change future costs and 
relative entitlements for different generations.  
 
This framework differs from others, which just look at generosity at the point of 
retirement, as it uses pension wealth - the value of all transfers during retirement. This 
captures the impact of both longevity and changes in the value of pensions during 
retirement. Moreover, rather than focusing only on average earners with full careers, 
this framework examines individuals at different wage levels, taking account of actual 
labour market participation. The countries analysed cover 70% of the EU‟s population 
and include examples of all system types. 
 
Our estimates indicate that while reforms have decreased generosity significantly, in 
most, but not all, countries the poverty alleviation function remains strong, 
particularly where minimum pensions have improved. However, moves to link 
benefits to contributions have made some systems less progressive, raising adequacy 
concerns for women and those on low incomes. The consumption smoothing function 
of state pensions has declined noticeably, suggesting the need for longer working lives 
or additional private saving for individuals to maintain pre-reform living standards. 
Despite the reforms, the size of entitlements of future generations should remain 
similar to that of current generations, in most cases, as the effect of lower annual 
benefits should be offset by longer retirement. Though reforms have helped address 
the financial challenge faced by pension systems, in many countries pressures remain 
strong and further reforms are likely. 
 
JEL Classification: H55, I38, J26. 
Keywords: Social Security and Public Pensions; Retirement; Poverty; Retirement 
Policies. 
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Introduction 
“Systems providing financial security for the old are under increasing 
strain throughout the world. Rapid demographic transitions caused by 
rising life expectancy and declining fertility mean that the proportion of 
old people in the general population is growing rapidly. Extended 
families and other traditional ways of supporting the old are weakening. 
Meanwhile, formal systems, such as government-backed pensions, have 
proved both unsustainable and very difficult to reform. In some 
developing countries, these systems are nearing collapse. In others, 
governments preparing to establish formal systems risk repeating 
expensive mistakes. The result is a looming old age crisis that threatens 
not only the old but also their children and grandchildren, who must 
shoulder, directly or indirectly, much of the increasingly heavy burden 
of providing for the aged.” 
 Averting the old age crisis (World Bank 1994) 
 
“Europe has started to prepare for these challenges, and encouraging 
progress has been made by some Member States…. However, without 
further institutional and policy changes, demographic trends are 
expected to transform our societies considerably, impinging on 
intergenerational solidarity and creating new demands on future 
generations. Such trends will have a significant impact on potential 
growth and lead to strong pressures to increase public 
spending…..Recent analysis confirms that there is a window of 
opportunity – a period of about ten years during which labour forces will 
continue to increase – for implementing the structural reforms needed by 
ageing societies. Taking no action would weaken the EU's ability to 
meet the future needs of an ageing population.” 
European Commission communication to the European Parliament and Council, 2009 
 
“The stabilisation of public pension spending can be attained also by 
means of reducing future generosity of pension benefits….The decline 
in the public pension benefit ratio over the period 2008 to 2060 is 
substantial, 20% or more in 11 Member States….It is very difficult to 
assess to what extent future pension benefits will be „adequate‟ in the 
future…The risk of a „too small‟ pension must not be overstated by 
focusing on the drop in the benefit ratio…” 
 2009 Ageing Report (Economic Policy Committee 2009) 
 
These quotations illustrate what is possibly the biggest social policy issue faced by 
governments across Europe. Having set up an intergenerational social contract 
through which workers finance significant transfers to the elderly on the assumption 
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that future workers will do the same,
1
 policymakers have in recent decades 
increasingly worried about the system‟s sustainability. Spurred by the ageing 
transition, many governments have carried out wide-ranging reforms, changing the 
public pensions landscape in Europe dramatically since the early 1990s. Nevertheless 
concerns about future costs remain at the top of the agenda of most EU finance 
ministers. Yet, public resistance to reforms remains strong, with strikes, 
demonstrations and increasingly cases of reform reversals or modifications, reflecting 
concerns about the social impact of the reforms. In this light, it is evident that 
policymakers need to develop a more comprehensive framework with which to assess 
the sustainability of their pension systems. Such a framework would look at financial 
sustainability and intergenerational equity but also give due weight to the impact of 
reforms on the achievements of their pension systems. As suggested by the quotations 
above, policymakers seem unsure of how to quantify and weigh against each other the 
different risks reforms face.  
 
Most pension reforms have been driven by a rather limited concept of sustainability, 
conceived as reducing projected levels of future spending on state pensions, through 
cuts in generosity. However, given the growing size of the pensioner population, there 
is an increasing risk that if the pension system does not fulfil public expectations, 
and/or older people find that they did not make appropriate saving and working 
decisions, the state could be forced by voters to reverse reforms and spend more on 
social transfers. Rather than focusing only on the effect of reforms on projected 
spending on pensions, assessments of reforms should also attempt to understand the 
implications of reforms on pension adequacy, particularly on entitlements of those 
population groups less able to accommodate the effects of benefit cuts through 
behavioural changes. The long-term sustainability of recent pension reforms depends 
crucially on their impact on the pension system‟s ability to reduce poverty and replace 
pre-retirement income and also on the ability of individuals to change their work and 
saving behaviour to accommodate the effects of reforms. 
 
This paper will develop this broader concept of social sustainability, and present 
evidence on pension reforms in ten European countries.
2
 At present, most studies on 
adequacy look at theoretical replacement rates at the point of retirement, while studies 
on financial sustainability concentrate on projected spending on pensions as a 
percentage of the national output in a future year. However, these approaches are not 
appropriate in light of the continued increase in longevity. An individual in future 
might be getting a pension which provides a lower replacement rate in any one year 
than under current rules, but still get the same amount of total transfers over the whole 
lifetime.
3
 Similarly the impact of an increase in longevity on the level of pension 
                                                     
1
  This method of financing pensions is known as Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) funding. 
2
  As explained later on, these countries were chosen not just on the basis of them having 
enacted significant reforms. The countries were also chosen so that there would be examples 
of all pension system designs and of the main types of reforms carried out across Europe 
since the start of the 1990s.  
3
  This is particularly important when looking at systemic pension reforms, such as those in 
Sweden and Poland – which result in annual pension benefits changing automatically with 
demographic developments. 
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spending builds up over time and cannot be captured fully by just looking at spending 
in a particular year. To assess the effective impact of reforms, one needs to look at a 
more sophisticated indicator of generosity, pension wealth – the value of all the 
prospective pension transfers received by an individual. This is not only a more 
comprehensive adequacy measure, but since it can also be used to determine the 
overall liabilities faced by governments, provides a direct link between adequacy and 
fiscal sustainability. Most studies, by contrast, compute adequacy and fiscal indicators 
separately.  
 
Another analytical failing of existing literature which this paper will try to address is 
the tendency to focus on pension outcomes for men who have had a full career at 
average earnings. This paper will show that this can be very misleading, both when 
assessing the outcomes of a current system and the possible impacts of pension 
reforms.
4
 Instead the approach taken in this paper will be to look at individuals of both 
genders across the whole of the income distribution and with careers which are more 
representative of actual labour market participation in their economies.  
 
The paper is divided in five sections. In the first, it summarises the evidence of the 
current role of state pensions in Europe and outlines their changing role. It then 
develops the concept of social sustainability and describes how this can be assessed by 
means of four indicators – based on pension wealth measures. The third section 
applies this framework by looking at reforms legislated in ten European countries 
between the early 1990s and 2008, and the overall assessment of social sustainability 
of country reforms synthesised in section 4. Finally the paper looks at the policy 
implications of these results, outlining the extent of changes in saving and labour 
market participation which could help sustain state pension reforms and also setting 
out the remaining challenges for the ten pension systems reviewed.  
 
1.  State pensions in Europe and their changing role 
There are significant differences in the size and design of state pension systems across 
Europe. Table 1 summarises these system design differences by setting out how state 
pension benefits are determined. At present, the dominant model remains defined 
benefit – where pensions are defined as some fraction of previous income. However, 
throughout the 1990s several countries have shifted to defined contribution formulae – 
where benefits are linked to contributions made and projected longevity. In particular, 
in most of Eastern Europe labour market entrants now depend mostly on personal 
accounts for their main retirement provision.   
 
                                                     
4
  Again this is particularly true for systemic pension reforms, which have tightened the link 
between benefits and contributions. 
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Table 1: Benefit-determination taxonomy of state pension systems in the EU 
 Contribution-
based, 
Flat-rate
1
 
Residence-
based, 
Flat-rate1 
Notional 
Defined 
Contribution
2
 
Defined 
Benefit
3
 
Points
4
 Defined 
Contribution 
personal 
accounts
2
 
Austria    X   
Belgium    X   
Greece    X   
Spain    X   
Portugal    X   
Slovenia    X   
Malta    X   
France    X X  
Germany     X  
Romania     X  
Luxembourg X   X   
UK X   X   
Czech Rep X   X   
Cyprus X   X   
Lithuania X   X  X 
Bulgaria    X  X 
Hungary    X  X 
Ireland X      
Finland  X  X   
Netherlands  X  X   
Estonia  X  X  X 
Denmark  X    X 
Sweden  X X   X 
Poland   X   X 
Latvia   X   X 
Italy   X    
 
1. Under a flat-rate system, all those who meet the set conditions (either a given amount of 
contributions paid or a period of residence in a country) get paid the same benefits. 
2. Under a defined contribution system, benefits are determined by the contributions made (and 
any return on them) and by the expected length of retirement. While in personal account systems, 
contributions are invested in financial markets, notional account systems are PAYG. 
3. In a defined benefit system, benefits are a ratio of a set salary – the final salary, the average 
lifetime salary or an intermediate figure - on which contributions were paid. 
4. Under a points system, entitlement is based on pension points accumulated. A year‟s 
contribution at the average earnings earns one point. Points are multiplied by a pension value to 
determine the monthly benefit. 
 
Note: Many countries are in some form of transition due to reforms, or to partial maturation of 
schemes. For classification purposes only rules as apply to new labour market entrants were 
considered. Only mandatory/quasi-mandatory provision was taken into account. 
Source: Own analysis using information in Economic Policy Committee (2007). 
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The differences in pension system designs are also reflected in the size of state 
pension outlays. Across the EU, state pension spending constituted more than a fifth 
of total government outlays in 2007, equivalent to over a tenth of national output. 
There is considerable variation in state pension spending across the EU, ranging from 
4% of GDP in Ireland to 14% of GDP in Italy, but in all countries pensions feature 
prominently. Moreover Figure 1 suggests that the expansion of state pensions does not 
solely reflect the expansion of state activity. State pension spending is high in 
countries, like Denmark and Sweden, with high overall public spending, but also in 
countries, such as Luxembourg and Poland, with a much smaller public sector. The 
similarity in pension expenditure levels is even more evident when one includes 
spending on occupational pension schemes.
5
   
 
Figure 1: Government spending and the share of state pensions (2007)  
 
 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the size of state pension spending.  
Source: Eurostat and Economic Policy Committee (2009). 
 
Data on incomes show that while they fall with age, the drop following retirement is 
not dramatic in most European countries. Across the EU25 in 2005-07, elderly people 
had a median income equal to 86% that of the working age population. Existing 
evidence suggests pensions are the main source of income for people aged over 65. 
There are some differences as to the relative importance of the state, but this is limited 
                                                     
5
  For instance, data from Eurostat‟s European System of Integrated Social Protection Statistics 
(ESSPROS) confirm that in the UK and the Netherlands, where provision has traditionally 
been allocated partially to employers, overall spending is comparable to that in countries with 
state-only provision. 
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to middle-to-high income groups, as can be seen in Table 2. In the entire EU, low 
income individuals depend crucially on the state for support.  
   
Table 2: Sources of income* of people aged 65 to 74, by income group (% of 
total) - 2003 
 Bottom 20% Middle 60% Top 20% 
 Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Work Priv Old 
age 
ben 
Oth 
ben 
Denmark  2 7 79 12 12 8 74 6 32 12 54 2 
Greece  10 3 82 4 9 5 84 2 13 12 75 0 
Sweden 1 2 83 14 4 3 91 2 16 7 76 1 
Portugal 5 1 85 9 17 2 77 4 23 7 70 1 
UK 2 4 85 9 8 8 76 8 23 17 59 1 
Ireland 5 2 86 8 20 4 72 4 48 11 41 0 
Austria 0 3 86 11 1 2 92 5 7 5 84 4 
Finland 3 1 86 10 9 4 79 8 26 7 62 5 
Spain  3 2 88 6 6 4 87 3 21 10 66 3 
France  1 5 89 4 3 6 90 2 4 8 86 1 
Italy 2 1 89 8 5 2 89 5 25 7 65 3 
Germany  1 3 91 4 4 4 90 1 12 10 77 1 
Luxembourg 1 1 91 7 2 6 88 4 9 19 69 3 
Netherlands 1 1 91 7 1 3 92 4 4 6 88 1 
Belgium  1 3 92 4 4 7 87 1 21 24 54 0 
 
Note: Countries arranged in order of the importance of old age benefits for the bottom 20%. 
* Old age benefits includes all social protection transfers intended to protect against the risks of old 
age – including state and occupational pensions, survivors benefits and in kind benefits. Other 
benefits include social assistance, housing benefits and disability benefits.  
Source: Zaidi et al (2006). 
 
Barr and Diamond (2006) argue that “from an individual viewpoint, income security 
in old age requires two types of instruments: a mechanism for consumption 
smoothing, and a means of insurance”.6 Furthermore they observe that “a second 
reason for government involvement is that public policy generally has objectives 
additional to improving consumption smoothing and insurance, notably poverty relief 
and redistribution”. Income survey data indicate that there are noticeable differences 
in the poverty alleviation and income replacement effects of the different retirement 
income schemes in Europe, and suggest that having similar institutional designs does 
not necessarily lead to similar income smoothing or poverty reduction. For instance, 
both Austria and Greece have a defined benefit state pension system, but the relative 
poverty rate among the elderly in Greece is nearly twice as high as in Austria. 
                                                     
6
  Whitehouse (2007) makes the same argument and, in fact, classifies the pension schemes of 
different countries on the basis of these two functions.  
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Table 3: Differences in poverty alleviation and income replacement of pensions 
(2005-2007)  
  
  
Relative income
1
   
  
Relative poverty
2
 
Male Female All Male Female All 
EU25 89 83 86 EU25 16 21 19 
Cyprus 62 57 56 Cyprus  48 54 51 
Ireland 67 66 65 Ireland  26 33 30 
Estonia 71 66 68 Spain  27 32 29 
Latvia 77 75 68 Latvia  17 34 28 
Denmark 73 71 69 UK  25 30 28 
UK 70 68 69 Portugal  26 27 27 
Belgium 72 73 72 Greece  23 27 26 
Finland 79 70 72 Estonia  15 32 26 
Lithuania 79 67 73 Lithuania  10 29 23 
Spain 75 74 73 Belgium  21 24 22 
Portugal 81 75 77 Italy  18 25 22 
Sweden 84 73 77 Finland  15 24 21 
Malta 79 80 78 Slovenia  11 25 20 
Czech Rep 80 78 80 Malta  22 19 20 
Greece 85 79 81 Denmark  16 19 18 
Slovakia 86 79 82 Germany  12 17 15 
Italy 87 82 83 Austria  10 18 15 
Netherlands 88 85 83 France  14 17 15 
Slovenia 92 79 84 Sweden  7 14 11 
France 92 88 87 Luxembourg  8 8 8 
Germany 89 87 88 Poland  6 9 8 
Austria 97 89 90 Slovakia  3 11 8 
Luxembourg 88 87 94 Hungary  5 9 7 
Hungary 99 88 95 Netherlands  7 8 7 
Poland 110 95 103 Czech Rep 2 8 5 
 
1. Relative income ratios of elderly people by gender - median equivalised incomes of 65+ by 
gender as % of that of the working age population by gender Countries arranged according to the size 
of their relative income ratio for the 65+. Countries with a below-EU average relative income ratio are 
in italics.  
2. Percentage of the 65+ population with an income less than 60% of median equivalised 
disposable income in that country. Countries ordered according to the size of the poverty rate of their 
65+ population. Countries with a poverty rate higher than the EU25 average are in italics.  
Source: Own analysis using EU-SILC (2005-07). 
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Consequently, rather than focusing on institutional features, it makes sense to 
investigate how the outcomes of pension systems are linked, so to understand better 
the real differences between countries‟ pension systems and help determine how 
reforms may change system performance. Given the above considerations that pension 
spending is the largest item in government budgets and that its main goals are income 
replacement and poverty alleviation, in Figure 2 we categorise pensions systems 
focusing on these three dimensions. Countries where pension spending as a percentage 
of the national output is higher (e.g. Italy) than the EU average are deemed to be high 
spenders, and are placed above the horizontal line in the Figure, and vice versa (e.g. 
Ireland). Similarly countries where the proportion of elderly with an income below the 
relative poverty threshold is higher than the EU average are placed to the left of the 
vertical line (e.g. Italy), and vice versa (e.g. Sweden). So, for instance, since Poland 
spends more than the EU average on state pensions and the poverty risk among its 
elderly is below the EU average, it is categorised in the upper right quadrant of the 
Figure. By contrast, Ireland, a country with lower-than-average pension spending and 
higher-than-average risk of pensioner poverty, is placed within the lower left 
quadrant. The other dimension of this pension system categorisation is illustrated by 
means of a darker shading of countries where the relative income ratio of elderly 
persons is above the EU25 average, typically because of a high replacement ratio of 
pensions. Thus Poland is in the darker shaded area, while Ireland is in the lighter 
shaded one. Given that countries with high relative income ratios tend to have lower-
than-average risk-of-poverty and higher-than-average spending, the darker shading 
occurs mostly in the upper right quadrant. Some countries, which seem to be moving 
away from their current position in relation to the EU average, are placed closer to the 
intersections of the sets in Figure 2.  
 
This process results in the identification of three relatively distinct groups of 
countries, depicted in Figure 1. Group A (e.g. Germany, France, Austria, Poland, 
Hungary) are characterised by high levels of income replacement and low pensioner 
poverty, but high spending. At the other extreme, Group B countries have both low 
levels of income replacement and high rates of pensioner poverty. Countries in this 
group can be further divided into those with high (e.g. Italy) and low levels (e.g. UK) 
of state pension spending. Group C (e.g. Sweden, Finland, Slovakia) is at an 
intermediate position, with relatively low levels of spending and low rates of relative 
poverty among pensioners, but also low levels of income replacement in retirement. 
The importance of this new taxonomy is that it helps in understanding the possible 
sources of system stress – namely high spending in Group A, high poverty in Group 
B, and low replacement in Group C. Thus, a priori, one might expect that reforms in 
countries of Group A would have focused on curbing expenditure; reforms in 
countries of Group C to have concentrated on improving income replacement; and 
reforms in countries of Group B to have been focused on two aspects: in countries 
with high spending – the curbing of spending followed by measures to tackle poverty 
and income replacement, and in countries with low spending – the expansion of the 
pension system.     
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Group 
A 
Group 
C 
 
Group 
B 
 
Austria,  
France,  
Germany 
 
Poland, 
Hungary, 
Luxembourg   
Slovenia 
Estonia 
Netherlands 
Malta, 
Czech Rep, 
Slovakia 
 
Denmark, 
Finland, 
Sweden 
Italy, 
Greece, 
Portugal 
 
     Belgium 
      
Spain 
Cyprus, 
UK, 
Ireland 
Lithuania 
Latvia 
High 
poverty 
Figure 2: Three-dimension pension system categorisation 
High 
spending 
Low 
spending 
Low 
poverty 
 
 
Note: Groups B and C are both shaded lightly, as countries classified in these groups have low 
replacement rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the 
horizontal line are high spenders on state pensions. Countries placed to the left of the vertical line 
have higher-than-average elderly poverty. The position of the countries in these groups reflects the 
extent to which their level of pension spending, relative income of the elderly and percentage of 
elderly population at risk-of-poverty differs from the EU average. 
 
However, most reviews of the pension reforms in Europe enacted since the 1990s 
show that the main consideration was long-term financial cost (and in some cases, 
especially in Eastern Europe, short-term financial problems and a desire to reduce the 
state‟s role).7 The impact of reforms on the capability of pension systems to achieve 
their aims has tended to be ignored or not given primary importance.  
  
2.  Defining and measuring pension system sustainability   
The notion that sustainability is achieved solely by cutting future spending is, 
however, far too simplistic. While there is consensus that ageing populations are a 
challenge for pension systems, the achievement of reduced growth in spending cannot 
be seen as the definitive solution to ageing. As Zaidi (2006) points out “policy-makers 
                                                     
7
  See for instance Martin and Whitehouse (2008), Zaidi and Grech (2007), Hering (2006) and 
Schneider (2009). 
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need to remember that pensions were not introduced by chance”.8 Spending on 
pensions is but a means to an end – the alleviation of poverty and the provision of 
income replacement during retirement. While spending is an important constraint, 
having low spending should not be elevated to the status of an objective. A pension 
system is not successful just because it involves little spending – a successful system 
is that which achieves its goals with the least pressure on constraints.   
 
Howse (2004) argues that most pension reformers are constrained by the belief that 
“the level of public expenditure as a proportion of GDP is already approaching the 
limits of political acceptability and economic efficiency” and that thus it is unfeasible 
to try to maintain the current situation by increasing taxes or pension contributions or 
by using public borrowing. However, he argues that even if this were correct, this 
“does not mean, of course, that the policy task is simply that of ensuring that these 
limits are not transgressed”, but that “the real problem for governments is how to 
ensure that people have adequate income in retirement without transgressing these 
limits”.  
 
The importance of this reasoning is increasingly being recognised. In its 2006 report 
on long-term sustainability, the European Commission notes that while declining 
pension generosity can contribute positively to fiscal sustainability, “such a decrease 
may raise concerns about the adequacy of public pensions that could translate into 
pressure for higher public spending”. The report also acknowledges that there is no 
great escape by simply reducing public responsibility and recognises that “the risks to 
public finances will crucially depend on the reaction of individuals regarding their 
future retirement arrangements”.9 Much in the same vein, Holzmann and Hinz (2005) 
present the revised World Bank position on pension reform arguing that “the primary 
goals of a pension system should be to provide adequate, affordable, sustainable, and 
robust retirement income”. Pension systems should provide “benefits to the full 
breadth of the population that are sufficient to prevent old-age poverty on a country-
specific absolute level in addition to providing a reliable means to smooth lifetime 
consumption for the vast majority of the population.” 
  
While financial sustainability is an important factor underlying the sustainability of a 
reform, simply focusing on it alone is seriously inadequate as by doing so, one fails to 
take into account what pension systems are expected to achieve. By adopting a narrow 
vision of spending on pensions, this approach also fails to take into account potential 
feedback effects on fiscal spending from the impact of reforms on pension system 
adequacy. Fiscal sustainability and pension system adequacy are not conflicting aims, 
but rather two sides of the same coin. Real fiscal sustainability cannot be achieved 
without ensuring pension system adequacy. If pension systems fall short, there could 
be strong political pressure for higher government spending on other support.  
 
                                                     
8
  See Ove Moene and Wallerstein (2003) for a discussion of why public pensions were set up – 
namely whether they represent a struggle for redistribution or a desire to have protection 
against particular risks. 
9
  European Commission (2006). 
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There appear to be four concerns in terms of ensuring pension system sustainability. 
From a political economy perspective, the adequacy of the system for the average 
voter needs to be ensured. If a system is not seen as beneficial by the electoral 
majority, namely by not helping them maintain their pre-retirement living standards, it 
could be voted out. Similarly if a system is not seen as able to alleviate poverty, the 
political pressures that led to the setting up of social assistance to elderly people 
during the early part of the twentieth century might re-emerge. In the process of 
achieving these two goals, policymakers need, however, to take into consideration the 
balance of transfers between different generations. Political pressures for reform can 
arise either because systems are not achieving the goals that individuals expect of 
them or because individuals are unhappy about the deal they are getting compared to 
previous generations. Individuals can be concerned about the level of taxes they pay to 
finance the system but also by the level of their pension transfers compared to 
previous generations. Social sustainability can only be achieved if policymakers 
understand these tradeoffs and optimise pension systems in this light.
10 
Figure 3 
summarises this discussion. 
 
 Figure 3: Fiscal sustainability and pension adequacy - Two sides of the same 
coin 
 
 
Income 
smoothing 
adequacy 
Poverty  
alleviation  
adequacy 
Pension 
transfers 
across 
generations 
Pension 
contributions 
across 
generations 
 
By contrast, up to now, evaluations of pension reform have either focused on pension 
spending projections or on the effect on theoretical replacement rates for full-career 
individuals on average earnings. The latter have been widely used as measures of 
adequacy. However, they suffer from a number of important deficiencies, such as 
being limited to single point-in-time comparisons and failing to capture the impact of 
changes in longevity. Similarly the full impact of longevity cannot be discerned by 
looking at single year projections of pension spending. Moreover spending projections 
and theoretical replacement rates have tended to be computed separately and in many 
cases, trends cannot be reconciled.             
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  Moreover, policymakers must be able to do this in the presence of considerable uncertainty, 
particularly as regards economic growth and longevity. 
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We contend that a better approach to evaluate pension reforms is to estimate pre- and 
post-reform pension wealth. The latter is the discounted stream of future pension 
payments during retirement, weighted by the probability that the individual will still 
be alive at that particular age. This measure captures the total pension transfer to an 
individual and is superior to replacement rates, as it captures the effects of benefit 
indexation post-retirement and of longevity. Pension wealth can be used to assess 
whether these transfers would result in individuals, on average, having an annual 
income that keeps them out of relative poverty during retirement, and also to calculate 
more accurately the degree of consumption smoothing that pension systems allow. 
Replacement rates at the point of retirement cannot do this as they fail to consider 
changes in the relative value of pensions over the retirement period. By comparing the 
pension wealth of two successive generations one can also arrive at an intuitive 
measure of intergenerational balance. Moreover, in conjunction with demographic and 
labour market data, pension wealth can be used to assess the long-term contribution 
rate needed to keep the pension system in financial balance across generations. This is 
a better measure of financial sustainability than focusing on projected spending on 
pensions (as a % of GDP) in one particular year as it takes into account the fact that 
longer-lived generations will require this spending for more years.  
 
As an empirical application of this framework, we estimated measures of pension 
wealth in 2005 and 2050 for hypothetical individuals under pre- and post-reform 
systems using the OECD‟s APEX cross-country pension entitlement model.11 In 
contrast with many other studies which just look at average male earners, we look at 
nine hypothetical individuals for each gender working full-time but at the different 
deciles of the wage distribution in each country, together with a hypothetical part-time 
worker (earning the median part-time wage) and an individual on minimum pension 
provision for each gender.
12
 Looking at different individuals is important as many 
pension systems are non-linear, and one cannot discern the poverty alleviation 
function of pensions by looking at average male earners. The benchmark for 
comparison was taken to be the situation in 2005 – when the pensioner generation was 
retiring under the pre-reform systems. By 2050, individuals were assumed to retire 
under the post-reform systems, while living longer lives.        
 
Pension wealth estimates were estimated for ten countries. The latter, namely Austria, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden and the UK, not 
only cover 70% of the EU‟s population, but also span the four different pension 
typologies developed in Section 1 of this paper and include examples of various types 
                                                     
11
  The APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across countries) model was originally 
developed by Axia Economics, with the help of funding from the OECD and the World Bank. 
The model codes detailed eligibility and benefit rules for mandatory pension schemes based 
on available public information that has been verified by country contacts. It provides most of 
the results reviewed in OECD‟s biennial „Pensions at a Glance‟ publication (see OECD 
(2005), OECD (2007) and OECD (2009) and Whitehouse (2007).  
12
  Wage data are from Eurostat‟s Structure of Earnings Survey 2002, and represent the annual 
wages of workers in most of the private sector (excluding farming and fishing). 
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of reforms. The reforms modelled were introduced between the early 1990s and 
2008.
13
  
 
Pension wealth estimates were used to calculate four social sustainability indicators, 
on a pre- and post-reform basis, as follows: 
 
(a) Achievement of System Goals  
 Strength of Poverty alleviation function = We assess the poverty threshold 
(average annual pension as a percentage of national disposable income) pension 
wealth, defined net of income taxes and social security contributions, of the 
hypothetical individuals would sustain through retirement. In this case we looked 
only at hypothetical individuals of each gender with below-median wages, and 
computed an aggregate indicator which is a weighted average of poverty 
thresholds achieved (with the weights dependent on the relative size of that group 
out of the total working age population). To simplify cross-country comparisons, 
we recalibrated the EU‟s relative poverty threshold – which stands at 60% of 
national disposable income – to be equivalent to 35% of the average full-time 
wage in each country.   
 Strength of Consumption Smoothing function = We assess how the annual average 
pension transfer implied by pension wealth, net of income taxes and social security 
contributions, would compare to pre-retirement wages. This in essence is the 
average replacement rate sustained throughout retirement by net pension wealth at 
the point of retirement. The ratio is calculated for all employed hypothetical 
individuals and then a weighted average (dependent on the relative size of that 
group out of the total employed) is taken as the aggregate indicator for that 
country. 
 
(b) Pressure on System Constraints 
 Intergenerational Balance = We express the pension wealth (weighted average for 
all our employed hypothetical individuals), defined in terms of the contemporary 
average wage, of the 2050 pensioner generation as a percentage of that of the 2005 
generation.  
 Financial Sustainability = We estimate the contribution rate out of the lifetime 
median wage required to pay aggregate gross pension wealth of the 2005 and 2050 
pensioner generations. To do this, we compute the average gross pension wealth 
(weighted average for all the employed hypothetical individuals) of a generation 
and multiply this by the ratio of beneficiaries to contributors at the time.  
 
In our modelling we assumed that there is full take-up of minimum pensions and that 
no private retirement saving is taking place – strong assumptions for countries with 
means-testing and significant private pension saving as take-up of benefits and the 
level of savings clearly affect state entitlements. Moreover our modelling skirted the 
                                                     
13
  The reforms do not consider legislated or proposed pension reforms in 2009. These changes, 
such as those carried out in Hungary in the wake of the financial crisis, could result in much 
lower generosity than envisaged in this paper. More recently a number of countries, such as 
UK and France, are looking at raising pension ages.   
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issue of household formation and calculated entitlements to single individuals, 
ignoring entitlements arising from the labour participation of their partners. The 
estimates also ignore the effects on entitlements of credits provided for non-
contributory periods – such as unemployment and childcare. These two 
simplifications can affect significantly results – especially for women. Finally, the 
indicators presented here assume pension wealth is transferred equally throughout 
retirement. In practice, transfers tend to be higher during the earlier part of retirement.   
 
The main contribution of this analysis lies in four methodological innovations. Firstly, 
it uses pension wealth – a measure of overall generosity of transfers throughout 
retirement - rather than measures of generosity at the point of retirement. This 
captures the impact of two elements, namely longevity and indexation rules, which 
tend to be ignored despite that they have important consequences for the achievement 
of system goals and pressures on system constraints. The second innovation is the 
explicit use of benchmarks against which to assess pension entitlements. Most 
frequently policy makers have not sought to look at benchmarks in this area, 
preferring to retain a good level of discretion on what constituted „adequate‟ 
outcomes. While the benchmarks used here can be seen as arbitrary, the framework is 
flexible enough to allow the testing of various outcomes. The third innovation is to 
attempt to measure all elements using the same indicators instead of using different 
models. This increases transparency and also clearly illustrates the trade-offs between 
system goals and constraints. Finally this framework is able to incorporate 
distributional and gender analysis – an element of pension reform assessment that has 
frequently not been given enough importance by policymakers.  
  
3.  Applying empirically the pension system sustainability framework 
Even when they look beyond the average male earner, most assessments of pension 
reforms assume full careers in full-time employment. This assumption, though 
analytically convenient, is unrealistic and poses problems for our proposed 
sustainability framework. The assumption of complete careers till pension age over-
represents the real efficacy of existing pension systems, by over-estimating the 
achievement of goals, since it implies that individuals benefit from the maximum 
generosity of the system, while diminishing the constraints faced, as it boosts the 
support ratio (as everyone is assumed to be in work). Moreover, reformers may have 
based their policy choices on the understanding that there would be developments in 
the labour market which would offset part of the effects of their reforms. To provide 
adequately effective answers to the empirical questions of whether pension reforms 
are socially sustainable and what are the required changes for individuals to maintain 
living standards, one needs to move away from the full-career assumption and adopt 
more representative labour market assumptions.  
 
The most desirable approach would be to estimate pension entitlements for our 
hypothetical individuals on the basis of actual and projected career lengths. However 
lack of comparable (cross-country) data on contribution records raises significant 
issues. This paper presents two sets of sustainability indictors. In the first set – the 
“full-careers” assumption – we focus on just the nine hypothetical full-time 
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individuals of each gender and assume that they work from age 20 to the state pension 
age in their country. We also assume that everyone of working age is in employment. 
In the second set – the “actual careers” assumption – we look at all eleven cases (thus 
including the representative part-time worker and the person on minimum provision in 
addition to the nine full-timers). Moreover instead of assuming full-careers for those 
in employment, estimates of the number of years spent in the labour market were 
constructed using EU LFS current and projected
14
 participation rates by age.
15 
While 
still subject to significant caveats,
16
 these estimates should present a more realistic 
view of the present and future efficacy of pension systems being studied, as current 
and projected labour participation rates, particularly among women, differ greatly 
among the ten countries. There are also interesting cross-country differences in part-
time employment. The aggregate results for the four sustainability indicators are 
presented for both the “full-careers” and “actual-careers” assumption in Tables 4 to 7, 
below.   
 
Our estimates suggest that while reforms have reduced the poverty alleviation and 
consumption smoothing functions in nearly all countries, generosity remains high in 
most of them, with pension transfers keeping most of those below median earnings 
above the 60% relative poverty threshold, on average, throughout retirement. Reforms 
have mostly followed existing system goals, but with an eye to reduce future cost. 
However there have been some reforms, mostly in Eastern Europe, which may have 
raised issues about the future adequacy of pension systems for women and those on 
lower incomes as the degree of progressiveness has been reduced considerably. The 
“actual careers” estimates, however, confirm that the interaction between the labour 
market and the social protection system needs to be considered by researchers and 
policymakers alike. A system may look very generous on paper, but not be so in 
reality if only few individuals qualify for full benefits. This tends to be particularly 
pertinent for women. The “full-career estimates” of the strength of the poverty 
alleviation function are far lower than those resulting when adopting more realistic 
labour market assumptions (see Table 4). For instance, the poverty threshold currently 
provided, on average, by the French pension system
17
 drops to 63% from 73% among 
men and from 67% to 44% among women. Overall, the “actual-careers” results are 
more in line with current data on the actual risk-of-poverty and gender gaps in poverty 
risks. For example, under the “full-careers” assumption, Italian women were among 
                                                     
14
  Projected participation rates were taken from EPC (2009). These were adjusted to reflect the 
legislated increase in pension age in Germany and the UK not considered in this study. 
15
  For instance if all those aged 20 to 24 participate in labour market activity, one would be 
justified in assuming that individuals contribute for 5 years during this period. If the 
participation rate, on the other hand, is 80%, the number of contribution years during this 
period is likelier to be 4 years. This principle is applied to all ages between 20 and pension 
age. 
16
  We are imposing the average labour market participation of a cross-section of generations on 
a single generation. Moreover we are assuming that all our individuals display average labour 
market participation trends over their career. These might instead differ across the wage 
distribution. 
17
  This is estimated by comparing the average pension wealth for the hypothetical individuals 
with below-median wages with the median equivalised disposable income in that country. 
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the best provided for across Europe, failing to explain their high relative poverty rate 
(see Table 2). The “actual-careers” estimates appear to be much more representative 
of effective pension generosity.  
  
Table 4: The poverty thresholds (% of median disposable income) achievable in 
2005 and 2050 under different labour market assumptions  
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 96 85 -11 95 74 -21 
Finland 79 72 -7 64 66 +2 
France 73 62 -11 63 59 -4 
Germany 69 58 -11 61 59 -2 
Hungary 79 82 +3 70 65 -5 
Italy 99 78 -21 95 68 -27 
Poland 77 54 -23 66 50 -16 
Slovakia 102 77 -25 93 51 -42 
Sweden 72 64 -8 70 65 -5 
UK 48 61 +13 46 59 +13 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change in 
p.p. 
Austria 69 70 +1 68 61 -7 
Finland 70 64 -6 57 58 +1 
France 67 59 -8 44 59 +15 
Germany 55 52 -3 48 56 +8 
Hungary 73 79 +6 68 59 -9 
Italy 79 71 -8 68 50 -18 
Poland 68 39 -29 55 35 -20 
Slovakia 82 62 -20 74 41 -33 
Sweden 60 54 -6 59 56 -3 
UK 41 60 +19 39 56 +17 
 
^ These indicators are the average for the 4 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers with below-
median wages.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for 4 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers with below-
median wages and the hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time 
and part-time workforce in each country.  
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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While these are important contributions, potentially the most interesting finding is that 
labour market trends can act as a countervailing force that offsets part of the effect of 
the pension reforms. This is particularly true in those countries where the reforms 
created closer links between contributions and benefits. Reforms, generally speaking, 
reduce the strength of the poverty alleviation function and result in a greater degree of 
convergence across countries. If one were to look at “full-careers”, reforms make 
systems more generous only in the UK and in Hungary. However taking into account 
actual and projected labour participation shows us a different picture. Effective 
generosity is set to improve in some countries, like France and Germany – on account 
of higher labour market participation. Thus the “full-careers” estimates show women 
as being the main losers of the reforms, with very substantial losses anticipated, for 
instance, among women in Poland and Slovakia. The “actual-careers” assumption 
reverses this finding for some countries, as can be seen from Table 4, though it should 
be noted not for those countries with the strongest losses. Growing labour 
participation might actually result in improvements over time in pension entitlements 
for women despite the reforms, cases in point being France and Germany. Moreover 
in many countries, cuts in the general pension system‟s generosity have been 
complemented by a strengthening of minimum pensions. This has the potential to 
reduce the impact of the reforms on pensioner poverty.  
 
There are similar trends when one looks at average replacement ratios – i.e. the 
strength of the consumption smoothing function. For instance, Table 5 shows that in 
Germany the average replacement ratio for men with a full career will be more than a 
sixth lower by 2050; and a fifth lower in Italy. The loss here is however relatively 
stronger and in countries like Poland, Austria and Italy the state pension on its own 
will not be enough to sustain pre-retirement levels of consumption. Again the decline 
here is much pronounced for men. Gender gaps in replacement rates should also 
decline, as men (with their fuller contributory records) will lose more in actual 
entitlements than women. This can be discerned by comparing the “full-careers” with 
the “actual-careers” cases – in some cases, e.g. Italy and Slovakia, the reforms favour 
those with full careers. However in many cases, the impact of the reforms on 
replacement rates differs by income; for those on high incomes generosity has been 
cut, while for those on low incomes it was maintained stable. In many European 
countries, the consumption smoothing function of the state pension system for middle-
to-high earners may need to be supplemented by other means. But there are notable 
exceptions – in Poland and Slovakia those at the bottom of the wage distribution face 
the toughest challenge as the system has become much less progressive.   
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Table 5: The average replacement ratios through retirement (% of pre-
retirement wages) achievable in 2005 and 2050 under different labour market 
assumptions 
 
a) Men  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 91 78 -13 89 66 -23 
Finland 75 69 -6 59 59 0 
France 68 57 -11 56 58 +2 
Germany 85 68 -17 71 69 -2 
Hungary 85 90 +5 74 62 -12 
Italy 92 72 -20 92 67 -25 
Poland 87 63 -24 67 56 -11 
Slovakia 72 67 -5 62 56 -6 
Sweden 66 62 -4 66 59 -7 
UK 40 48 +8 37 53 +16 
 
b) Women  
 Full-careers assumption^ Actual-careers assumption* 
 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
2005 2050 
Change 
in p.p. 
Austria 83 82 -1 75 66 -9 
Finland 75 70 -5 58 60 +2 
France 71 61 -10 41 51 +10 
Germany 82 71 -11 59 67 +8 
Hungary 83 90 +7 74 64 -10 
Italy 82 73 -9 65 50 -15 
Poland 86 50 -36 65 43 -22 
Slovakia 83 67 -16 75 56 -19 
Sweden 71 64 -7 66 57 -9 
UK 44 60 +16 40 57 +17 
 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the respective share of full-time and part-time workforce 
in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
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Turning to pressures on constraints, our estimates suggest that had replacement ratios 
remained untouched by reforms, future generations of pensioners would have got 
much larger net pension transfers as a result of increasing longevity. The reforms 
appear to have addressed this. So while year-on-year replacement rates may have 
fallen, generally, future pensioners still get more transfers than current ones, with the 
exception of Italy, Poland and Slovakia. In these countries the drop is quite significant 
and reflects the large financial problems which these countries would have faced had 
they retained their previous system rules. Table 6 indicates that the consideration of 
labour market participation does not result in any significant reinterpretation of the 
development of the relative size of intergenerational pension transfers. Rising labour 
participation and increasing longevity should result in net pension wealth expanding 
slightly in many countries. Interestingly while under “full-careers”, women generally 
lose out compared to men, on account of the equalisation of pension ages, the “actual-
careers” assumption shows them in some countries, such as France and Germany, as 
being better off as their entitlements are buoyed by their rising labour participation 
(see Table 6).  
 
Table 6: The net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to that of the 
2005 generation under different labour market assumptions (%)  
 Male Female 
 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Full-careers 
assumption^ 
Actual-careers 
assumption* 
Austria 109 94 98 87 
Finland 114 125 106 119 
France 98 101 96 141 
Germany 92 104 95 124 
Hungary 131 116 112 82 
Italy 95 77 87 76 
Poland 106 83 69 73 
Slovakia 109 80 79 58 
Sweden 107 112 100 96 
UK 127 127 112 117 
 
^ These indicators are the averages for the 9 hypothetical full-timer full-career workers.  
* These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full- and part-time workforce in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
In Table 7 we present estimates of the contribution rates workers in 2005 and 2050 
would need to pay to finance the pension transfers to the pensioner cohorts retiring in 
those years. For 2050, the financing cost is presented both for the reformed pension 
systems and also assuming no reforms had taken place (so that system rules remained 
as at 2005). Table 7 suggests that while generosity is smaller under the “actual 
careers” assumption, the financing requirements of pension systems are significantly 
higher under the actual-careers assumption. On average, across Europe a contribution 
rate of 17% is required to finance the pension wealth of the currently retired as against 
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the 11% implied when modelling full-careers. Moreover in the absence of reforms, 
fiscal pressures would have increased substantially more. The impact of the ageing 
transition, in fact, would be compounded by the impact of increasing women‟s 
entitlement to pensions. The reforms, however, partially address this factor so that the 
increase in fiscal pressures by 2050 is of around 10 percentage points, on average. 
There are some notable outliers, however, such as France, Poland and Slovakia, where 
the required increase is around double this increase. In these countries, weak labour 
market participation combines with rapid ageing to make up a very dangerous 
cocktail. The trends implied by the estimates in Table 7 differ from standard 
assessments of pension spending projections, as they suggest that despite reforms the 
financing burden of pension systems will still increase very significantly (by contrast, 
EPC (2009) suggests pension spending across the EU will rise by just 2.4% of GDP 
by 2060). This is because our measure captures better the full implications of 
longevity increases, by looking at pension spending for the whole retirement period of 
a cohort, rather than focusing on one year of future spending. 
 
Table 7: Comparing financial sustainability under the different careers 
assumptions* 
 
Full-careers assumption Actual-careers assumption 
2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 2005 
Pre-reform 
2050 
Post-reform 
2050 
Austria 13.8 27.3 22.7 19.3 47.7 26.8 
Finland 8.5 20.4 18.3 8.7 23.7 20.9 
France 14.6 29.6 24.3 21.0 50.3 41.4 
Germany 8.0 17.9 14.4 11.8 39.6 20.9 
Hungary 22.0 43.0 30.8 37.7 80.9 44.5 
Italy 17.3 34.1 24.7 29.7 67.1 31.6 
Poland 8.4 30.4 20.7 14.4 67.7 34.7 
Slovakia 11.1 35.9 24.6 20.6 85.4 38.7 
Sweden 10.1 18.3 16.7 11.5 30.4 21.5 
UK 5.8 7.1 6.7 9.1 17.6 10.3 
Average^  11.1 23.6 18.3 17.5 47.2 27.2 
 
* The proportion of total lifetime wages needed to finance the pension wealth of different generations.  
^ The contribution rate of a country is weighted in line with relative population size.   
Source: Own estimates using APEX, EU labour market and population projections. 
 
4.  Overall assessment of social sustainability of pension reforms  
The achievement of “sustainability” has been the main objective that policymakers 
have set themselves when reforming pension systems. While this paper acknowledges, 
and its findings confirm, the importance of achieving long-term sustainability of 
pension systems given the significant challenges they face, it has argued that 
policymakers need to adopt a more comprehensive definition of sustainability. When 
looking into the future, policymakers need to reassure themselves not only that 
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pressure on constraints is being managed properly, but also that the pension system 
remains effective and is in a position to achieve the goals it is expected to. To do this, 
policymakers need to be able to map out the impact of reforms on the strength of the 
poverty alleviation and consumption smoothing functions, particularly for groups with 
low incomes and/or partial careers, together with the influence reforms have on 
relative size of transfers between generations, both in terms of the net pension wealth 
accruing to future generations and the contribution rates required to finance these 
transfers. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 present an example of how this mapping out can be made. They 
compare how the achievement of the twin goals of pension systems and the pressure 
on system constraints should change by 2050 when looking across the aggregate 
pensioner population. This approach allows one to understand whether one aim is 
being sacrificed for better results on the other, and provides an indication of how the 
role and scope of state pension systems will evolve. The fact that this comparison is 
done on a cross-country basis also allows one to understand how different 
policymakers reacted to similar challenges. There are some quite striking similarities. 
For instance, only countries which faced a very substantial fiscal challenge due to 
ageing put in place reforms that cut the relative size of total pension transfers to future 
generations. In most countries, the reforms offset only part of the effect on pension 
wealth of the projected rise in longevity, and accommodate the projected change in the 
relative size in the pensioner population by a rising (implied) contribution rate.  
 
Figure 4: The development of system achievements 
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Note: The indicators presented show the poverty threshold (as a % of the national median disposable 
wage) that could be achieved, on average, throughout retirement by our estimates of the average net 
pension wealth of our 4 hypothetical individuals of each gender with below-median wages in each 
country. They also show the replacement rate (% of the individuals‟ pre-retirement wage) that could 
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be achieved, on average, throughout retirement by our estimates of the average net pension wealth of 
our 9 hypothetical full-time workers and our part-time worker of each gender (weighted in line with 
the share of full-time and part-time employment in that country).   
 
Figure 5: The development of system constraints 
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Note: The indicators presented show the average net pension wealth (in terms of the contemporary 
average wage) of our 9 hypothetical full-time workers and our part-time worker of each gender 
(weighted in line with the share of full-time and part-time employment in that country).They also 
show   the contribution rate (% of lifetime wages) required to finance this average net pension wealth 
given the ratio of pension beneficiaries to contributors.  
  
Figure 4 points out how most countries will converge towards providing pension 
wealth which keeps individuals above the 60% poverty threshold throughout 
retirement. The only exceptions appear to be Poland and Slovakia. Despite these 
radical cuts, these countries will still experience large increases in their financing 
costs (see Figure 5), on account of steeply declining support ratios. Improving 
employment rates could help stem these developments. In a similar vein, in France the 
system seems to face significant fiscal challenges, which could be partially addressed 
by increasing employment at older ages and raising the state pension age – two 
options which the French government is looking at.
18 
  
 
The above analysis can be deepened by looking more closely at the social 
sustainability indicators, and zooming to particular sections of the population. For 
instance, Figure 6 compares the gender and income distribution effects of pension 
                                                     
18
  Hungary also faces pressures, but these may have been addressed by recent reforms not 
modelled here.  
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reforms in Poland and the UK. This shows very clearly that the impact of the pension 
reforms in Poland will be more strongly felt by those on low incomes, and particularly 
women. By contrast in the UK, the effects of reforms are clearly very progressive. Our 
social sustainability indicators help set out the major risks faced by pension systems. 
They show that in some countries, like Poland and Slovakia, pensioner poverty could 
become an issue, while in others future pensioner generations may be seen to be 
favoured at the expense of current pensioner generations (e.g. Finland, UK) and/or 
future generations of workers (e.g. France). At the same time, it is important to stress 
that these considerations are valid only if the assumptions on future employment 
growth and longevity prove correct. In some countries, the assessment would be very 
different if working careers remained unchanged (particularly among women) – e.g. 
poverty risks in Germany and Italy would be higher – or if longevity were to improve 
at a faster pace – e.g. the contribution rate in France and Hungary would need to rise 
by substantially more.    
 
Figure 6: Net pension wealth of the 2050 generation compared to the 2005 
generation for the 11 hypothetical cases 
       
 
In Figure 7, we return to the taxonomy depicted in Figure 2 and attempt to show how 
the composition of the different pension system categories might change by 2050 as a 
result of reforms. However it should be kept in mind that the overall situation in 2050 
will be very different from that in 2005, as can be inferred from the averages for the 
four indicators shown in Figures 4 and 5. In particular, the level of pension spending, 
on average, will be significantly higher, there will be more convergence across 
countries in terms of replacement rates and the risk-of-poverty among pensioners 
could be higher than in Figure 2.  
 
The estimated changes in the social sustainability indicators suggest that while there 
will still be three general groups of countries (Group A – systems with high levels of 
income replacement and low pensioner poverty, but high spending, Group B – 
systems with high or low spending, but low replacement rates and high pensioner 
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poverty, and Group C – systems with low spending, low replacement rates and low 
pensioner poverty); the composition of the groups could change significantly. For 
instance, Poland and Slovakia could go to join Italy in Group B, as their level of 
pensioner poverty could be negatively affected by the pension reforms they have put 
in place, while at the same time the lack of labour participation combined with ageing 
will result in a substantial increase in their pension financing cost. Group B will, 
however, probably lose one member, the UK. By focusing resources even more on 
those on low incomes and women, the UK pension system should make inroads on 
pensioner poverty while maintaining spending low on account of the planned increase 
in pension ages. The UK could join the Scandinavian duo, Finland and Sweden, but 
their level of pension spending will increase, rising to levels which in 2005 
characterised high-spending countries. In Group A, besides the movement of Poland, 
Hungary could be moving towards Group B, as the reforms leave some groups at-risk-
of-poverty.  
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Figure 7: Evolution of pension systems by 2050 
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Low 
spending 
Low 
poverty 
 
 
Note: Groups B and C are both shaded lightly, as countries classified in these groups have low 
replacement rates; while those in Group A have high replacement rates. Countries placed above the 
horizontal line are high spenders on state pensions. Countries placed to the left of the vertical line 
have higher-than-average elderly poverty. The position of the countries in these groups reflects the 
extent to which their level of pension spending, relative income of the elderly and percentage of 
elderly population at risk-of-poverty differs from the EU average. Countries which are expected move 
categories as a result of the reforms are shown in italics. The arrows show the direction of movement 
of the country‟s pension system along the three dimensions studied.  
25 
 
The position of Austria, Germany and France may also change, as they move closer to 
Group C in terms of the replacement rates they provide. One could argue that France 
will separate from the other two, as it faces much higher projected increases in 
spending, and join Hungary, but at the same time the French system appears to have a 
much more effective poverty alleviation function than the Hungarian one. The only 
country that might still be in the same place it occupies today is Italy. While the 
reforms mean that it will be less of an outlier in spending terms, low labour 
participation among older workers and women, together with lack of pension 
protection for the unemployed could keep pensioner poverty levels high while the 
reforms have cut the replacement rates individuals can look forward to in 2050.  
 
5.  Policy considerations 
After having applied our social sustainability assessment framework empirically, we 
can now proceed to make some policy considerations. Two questions appear to be 
particularly relevant in this respect – namely the possibility that changes in individual 
economic behaviour could accommodate changes in pension generosity; and the 
resilience of pension systems to shocks.  
 
Policymakers have tended to argue that any negative impacts of pension reforms on 
retirement income can be undone by means of additional private saving. While this 
may be feasible for those on medium- to high-incomes, this is less likely for those 
with low-incomes. In Table 8 we show that in many countries these individuals would 
need to save relatively high amounts in order to generate the same average 
replacement rates throughout retirement as in 2005, even if they accept the reduction 
in pension wealth due to higher pension ages. Moreover, notably in Poland and 
Slovakia, this task is made more difficult by the fact that individuals will also be 
called upon to pay higher contribution rates to pay for contemporary pension transfers.  
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Table 8: Additional saving (% of wages) to maintain consumption smoothing 
(actual-careers case) unchanged between 2005 and 2050 (assumed net nominal 
rate of return: 5.5%) 
 
a) Men 
 10th 
Decile 
20th 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.7 8.0 8.5 9.2 8.0 8.7 
Finland           
France   2.6 4.8 4.8 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.0 5.1 
Germany  0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.3 3.0 4.0 1.4 
Hungary 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3     
Italy 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.5 13.7 13.9 13.9 13.6 13.2 13.6 
Poland 8.9 7.2 6.3 4.7 4.3 3.7 2.8 1.8 0.6 6.4 
Slovakia  12.6 12.9 13.1 13 11.5 7.5 3.6   12.9 
Sweden 3.4 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7    
UK           
 
b) Women 
 10th 
Decile 
20th 
Decile 
30th 
Decile 
40th 
Decile 
50th 
Decile 
60th 
Decile 
70th 
Decile 
80th 
Decile 
90th 
Decile 
Part-
time 
Austria 2.2 3.8 4.0 3.2 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.8 3.3 
Finland           
France           
Germany        0.2 1.0  
Hungary 7.8 5.3 6.8 5.6 5.8 6.0 6.3 5.9 5.6 6.0 
Italy 6.3 5.2 6.2 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8 6.3 6.4 5.8 
Poland 15.4 14.6 13 12.5 11.9 11 9.7 8.3 6.7 12.6 
Slovakia  17.7 18.2 18.5 18.7 18.9 18.9 19.0 16.3 6.6 18.7 
Sweden 5.0 5.1 4.4 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.0 0.7 3.9 
UK           
 
Note: In cases where consumption smoothing will be higher in 2050, no estimates are made. 
Source: Own workings using APEX. 
 
Longer working lives present a more likely way of maintaining consumption 
smoothing. Table 9 presents estimates of the change in replacement rates, on average, 
under different career lengths. This confirms that reforms place a significant 
disincentive for individuals to maintain the same career length as in 2005. By contrast, 
longer careers undo a significant part of the reduction in generosity, except in 
countries with very high replacement rates. In the latter cases, policymakers appear to 
have concentrated on reducing costs.  
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Table 9: The overall replacement ratio (% of pre-retirement wage) achievable in 
2005 and change by 2050 under different labour market assumptions*  
 
a) Men^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Change by 
2050 under 
2005 career  
Change by 
2050 under 
assumed 
career 
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 1 
year more 
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 3 
years more 
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 5 
years more 
Austria 89 -27 -23 -22 -20 -18 
Finland 59 -4 0 +1 +2 +3 
France 56 -2 +2 +3 +7 +8 
Germany 71 -3 -2 -1 +1 +3 
Hungary 74 -16 -12 -11 -6 -3 
Italy 92 -27 -25 -24 -22 -22 
Poland 67 -15 -11 -10 -8 -7 
Slovakia 62 -9 -6 -5 -3 -2 
Sweden 66 -9 -7 -4 +1 +6 
UK 37 +15 +16 +16 +17 +17 
 
b) Women^ 
 
2005  
(%) 
Change by 
2050 under 
2005 career  
Change by 
2050 under 
assumed 
career 
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 1 
year more 
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 3 
years more  
Change by 
2050 if 
career is 5 
years more  
Austria 75 -16 -9 -8 -6 -3 
Finland 58 -6 +2 +2 +1 +2 
France 41 +7 +10 +10 +12 +15 
Germany 59 +7 +8 +9 +11 +13 
Hungary 74 -19 -10 -9 -5 -4 
Italy 65 -21 -15 -14 -13 -10 
Poland 65 -26 -22 -21 -21 -20 
Slovakia 75 -23 -19 -18 -15 -14 
Sweden 66 -17 -9 -7 -2 +2 
UK 40 +14 +17 +17 +19 +19 
 
* This represents the replacement rate (defined in terms of pre-retirement income) throughout 
retirement which net pension wealth at pension age could finance.  
^ These indicators are the weighted averages for the 9 hypothetical actual-careers full-timers and the 
hypothetical part-timer. The weights reflect the share of full-time and part-time work in each country. 
Source: Own analysis using APEX. 
 
Labour market participation also plays a large part in ensuring the resilience of 
pension systems to shocks. Different longevity assumptions have significant impacts 
on the sustainability indicators, particularly for those countries which have not 
adopted features in their pension systems which automatically take into account 
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improvements in life expectancy. Longevity increases the length of retirement, and 
tends to reduce overall generosity as pensions in payment tend to lose value relative to 
average earnings over time. The resilience of the poverty alleviation function to higher 
longevity is very dependent on the generosity of minimum pensions (e.g. pensioners 
in Sweden and Italy are better protected than those in Poland), while that of 
consumption smoothing is linked to the length of working lives, particularly in 
systems which have linked closer contributions and benefits.  
 
As for the pressure on constraints, longevity shocks inevitably result in stronger 
impacts, though the UK with its relatively modest and increasingly flat pension 
system is also not that much affected by higher longevity. The Hungarian system is 
the one that appears least resilient (see Figure 8). By contrast the French system 
appears to be one of the systems which would gain the most if working lives rise, with 
each additional year cutting the required increase in contribution rates by nearly one 
percentage point. In countries like Sweden, Germany, and France the fiscal impact of 
a two-year rise in longevity can be offset by a three-year increase in working lives, 
while in others, such as Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia a six-year increase would 
suffice. 
 
Figure 8: Change in contribution rate (% of total lifetime wages) required to 
finance pension transfers implied by different longevity and labour market 
participation assumptions 
 
 
In light of the analysis made in this section, Table 10 provides a final overview of the 
reforms and the remaining issues that policymakers in these countries need to address. 
In some countries, e.g. France, the crucial first step is to address the financial 
sustainability of the system, by increasing the effective retirement age. In others, e.g. 
Poland, the emphasis could be on providing better safety nets, particularly for women. 
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In others, e.g. the UK and Italy, policymakers should attempt to entrench for the long-
term the principles introduced by recent reforms.   
 
 Table 10: Overview of the reforms and remaining issues 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Austria Generosity cut but system 
remains quite adequate 
and gender outcomes 
more equal; those on high 
incomes require private 
saving to achieve 
previous income 
smoothing.  
 
Reformed system reduces 
slightly future pension 
wealth, but contribution 
rate still needs to rise. 
There may be scope for 
further reductions in 
system generosity for 
high earners but at the 
same time try to raise 
labour participation 
among those aged 50+. 
Finland Achievement of system 
aims to improve slightly; 
but very high penalties 
for periods spent 
unemployed, minimum 
pensions relatively low. 
Very substantial rise in 
required contribution rate 
reflecting the fact that 
pension wealth to 
increase at same time that 
number of pensioners will 
rise. 
Need to extend working 
lives so that effective 
retirement age rises; 
provide a better safety net 
for those on low incomes 
and unemployment 
credits; private saving 
needs to provide the 
income smoothing that 
state system does not 
allow. 
 
France Better poverty alleviation 
because of higher 
minimum pensions and 
credits for childcare and 
unemployment; but drop 
in previous income 
smoothing through state 
alone. 
 
Very strong rise in 
required contribution rate, 
with net pension wealth 
rising notably on account 
of longevity rise. 
Employment rates among 
the over 50 and women 
are an issue; raise pension 
age to induce longer 
working lives; need to 
sustain state system with 
private saving. 
Germany Reform makes system 
more progressive and 
makes gender outcomes 
more equal. 
Women set to receive 
much higher pension 
wealth, and together with 
ageing this will raise 
fiscal cost of the system 
significantly. 
 
Income smoothing may 
require more private 
saving; need to extend 
working lives beyond age 
60. 
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Table 10: Overview of the reforms and remaining issues..cont.. 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Hungary Reforms have made a 
generous system even 
more generous for those 
on high incomes while 
provision for women and 
those on low incomes 
seems lacking, 
particularly in terms of 
contribution credits. 
The pension system faces 
a very substantial fiscal 
challenge; while pension 
wealth remains stable 
despite state pension age 
rise. Note however that a 
2009/10 IMF-inspired 
pension reform may have 
helped to address this 
financing problem. 
Make the system more 
progressive and cut 
generosity for those on 
high incomes while 
redirecting spending to 
provide better pensions 
for women and those on 
low incomes; introduce 
automatic adjustments so 
that longevity shocks do 
not overburden the 
system; employment rates 
among those aged 50+ 
are very low. 
 
Italy Reform has decreased 
generosity substantially 
and could result in a 
significant rise in poverty 
among women; 
unemployment carries a 
very heavy price in 
pension terms.  
Pension system quite 
expensive at present, but 
reform reduces future 
rises in contribution rates 
by decreasing pension 
wealth very significantly 
for future pensioners. 
Employment among the 
young, 50+ and women 
very low and if increased 
would help address 
financial cost; adequate 
consumption smoothing 
requires private saving; 
provide better protection 
for unemployment and 
improve outcomes for 
those on low incomes, 
possibly by making 
system progressive; make 
sure automatic 
adjustments are enforced. 
 
Poland Reform has reduced 
significantly system‟s 
progressiveness and there 
are serious poverty 
concerns for women and 
those on low incomes; 
very little protection for 
women with children and 
the unemployed. 
System faces a very 
substantial fiscal 
challenge, even though 
future net pension wealth 
has been reduced. 
Employment among the 
young, 50+ and women 
very low and if increased 
would reduce costs and 
improve adequacy; low 
pension age for women 
combined with NDC 
system makes them worse 
off – pension age should 
be equal; need to improve 
minimum pensions and 
provide contribution 
credits: financed by 
cutting pensions for those 
on high incomes. 
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Table 10: Overview of the reforms and remaining issues..cont.. 
 System aims System constraints Policy options 
Slovakia Reform has reduced 
significantly system‟s 
progressiveness and there 
are serious poverty 
concerns for women and 
those on low incomes, 
unless labour 
participation rises in 
older ages. 
Reform has reduced the 
required increase in 
contribution rates, but 
system still faces big rise. 
Pension wealth cut for 
future generations, 
particularly women and 
those on low incomes. 
Increase labour 
participation among those 
aged 50+, revisit the 
extent of cuts made for 
those on lower incomes – 
by providing better 
minimum pensions 
and/or credits for periods 
spent unemployed. 
  
Sweden Post-reform system aims 
achievement remains 
adequate but this is now 
more dependent on 
extending working lives, 
some concern for those 
dependent on minimum 
pension – uprated by 
prices. 
Achieves good degree of 
intergenerational balance; 
limits fiscal pressure by 
cutting benefits if people 
retire at same age. 
Continue to support the 
pension system with an 
active labour market 
policy; ensure individuals 
are aware of the need of 
working longer, earnings 
uprate the minimum 
pension; supplement state 
system with private 
saving to achieve better 
income smoothing. 
 
UK Improvements in pension 
alleviation function – 
particularly among 
women; state system on 
its own, however, is just 
a foundation for adequate 
retirement provision. 
Financial pressure 
relatively low, on account 
of rising pension age 
Ensure private pensions 
fulfill income smoothing 
role; reduce reliance on 
means-tested benefits – 
where non take-up could 
reduce effectiveness of 
poverty alleviation; 
ensure pension age policy 
remains linked to 
longevity. 
 
  
Conclusion 
The main analytical contribution of the above analysis is the holistic and internally 
consistent way in which reforms are evaluated. By looking at the various elements 
together, it is easier to understand the trade-offs which can be exploited and the risks 
that particular policies may pose. While most literature has focused solely on how best 
pension systems can face the challenge posed by the ageing transition, this analysis 
has refocused the discussion on the really central question – what do pension systems 
achieve and at what cost. Just looking at one part of the phrase – „at what cost‟ – is 
counterintuitive. Rather policymakers need to focus on what realistically systems can 
achieve, and act in a way as to change individual behaviour so that any changes in 
public provision are accommodated by private actions.  
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The social sustainability framework proposed in this paper allows the analysis of 
various other questions and can be used to generate a lot of in-depth analysis of the 
consequences of reforms on different individuals. The framework lends itself to being 
used across different pension regimes and enables comparison of reforms which are 
very different in nature. It can also be used to see how systems are changing and the 
extent of convergence in system goals and pressure on constraints. This multi-faceted 
framework is not however to be conceived as some form of benchmarking exercise. 
Rather its main aim is to capture as much as possible the full implications of reforms 
in order to arrive at some understanding of the potential pressures policymakers could 
face in the future, and help map the tactical and strategic decisions which 
policymakers have taken or need to take to achieve long-term stability in this field.  
 
This assessment framework also clearly puts longevity at the centre of analysis. In 
spite of being the main long-term determinant of the size of pension transfers, 
longevity has tended to be ignored in most existing literature assessing pension 
reforms. By concentrating on point-in-time indicators like prospective theoretical 
replacement rates at retirement and spending as a percentage of the national output in 
some future year, this literature has failed to grasp the full impacts of increasing 
longevity on pension adequacy and financial sustainability. A failure to use pension 
wealth measures has led most studies to argue that pension transfers to future 
generations have been much reduced by recent reforms and that the latter have 
addressed large part of the additional financial costs induced by ageing. The analysis 
presented in this paper changes somewhat these conclusions, showing that while most 
governments have sought to reduce the future burden on taxpayers, increasing 
longevity means that the relative size of pension transfers will remain broadly similar 
– except in countries with very large projected spending (where policymakers have 
made more aggressive cuts).  Looking at projected levels of pension wealth also 
indicates that some systems remain very vulnerable to longevity shocks.  
 
Similarly our estimates show that the focus on modelling “full-careers” can be very 
misleading, particularly when looking at reforms which have tightened links between 
benefits and contributions. For instance, in Slovakia the poverty threshold achievable 
by pension transfers to low-income individuals could nearly halve when considering 
projected labour market participation rates. The “full-careers” assumption, by contrast, 
implies a drop of just a fifth. Rising labour participation in many cases can help undo 
a lot of the cuts in system generosity. The analysis in this paper, however, suggests 
that pensioner poverty may once again re-emerge as an important issue in some 
countries where at present its low level does not attract much political attention. 
Moreover in some cases, such in Eastern European countries, moves to link benefits 
with contributions may have serious gender equality implications. Policymakers need 
to be well aware of these risks and take them into account when designing sustainable 
reforms. Pension reforms of this kind need to be sustained by effective measures to 
increase labour market participation and to make sure individuals are aware of the 
new financial incentives/costs embedded in new pension systems. While clearly 
linking benefits to contributions makes sense to provide an effective and sustainable 
income smoothing function, policymakers also need to remain aware of the crucial 
poverty alleviation function of state pensions.  
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While this paper has shed some light on these risks, there is scope for much more 
research. The hypothetical individuals used in this dissertation are an improvement on 
the standard full-career hypothetical cases, but they still fail to capture the intricacies 
of the real world. Policymakers would need to look at a wider variety of cases, 
particularly for different types of broken careers, and model more refined socio-
economic differences in labour participation. Another important modelling issue that 
this research has skirted is household formation and to what extent this makes a 
difference to the social sustainability indicators. For instance, no assessment was 
made of whether women‟s position would be better in some countries if one were to 
consider entitlement to their partners‟ pension. Similarly no attempt was made to 
allow non take-up of minimum pensions, or consider their interaction with private 
saving. Private provision was also assumed non-existent and this is a major 
simplification, particularly for some countries, notably the UK. Current provision and 
expected developments in this field have very important implications for the social 
sustainability of state pension systems.         
 
Despite these very important analytical considerations, the social sustainability 
framework developed in this paper has enabled us to arrive at an improved 
understanding of whether the reforms conducted in Europe during the last decade will 
prove to be sustainable. It confirms that in many cases, there remains more to be done 
to address the financial requirements brought by the rapid ageing of Europe‟s 
population. It shows that when pressed, policymakers, particularly in Western Europe, 
were more willing to sacrifice the income smoothing function of pensions rather than 
poverty alleviation. This is a decision that makes considerable sense as middle- to 
high-income individuals are possibly in a better position to accommodate the effect of 
state pension reforms by increasing their private saving. In this regard, in view of the 
need to potentially decrease in absolute size the net pension wealth of future 
generations, policymakers in countries with the most severe pressures should consider 
further increases in state pension ages, complemented with an improvement in the 
labour market participation of older working age individuals. By maintaining the 
proportion of life spent in retirement unchanged across generations, policymakers 
would be better able to achieve similar system aims as under current systems. This 
would minimise the required increase in future financing requirements. At the same 
time, this analysis suggests that in some cases, notably in Eastern Europe, 
policymakers have abandoned the pursuit of the previous aims of their pension system 
and may not have fully considered the full impact of their policies on those on low 
incomes, on those with incomplete careers and on women. The required increase in 
private saving combined with the additional contributions required to finance public 
pensions appears to be too hefty for those on low incomes. Having a state pension 
which is able to alleviate poverty and provide a solid foundation for individuals to 
pursue their desired level of consumption smoothing will become even more 
important as the ageing transition progresses.   
 
If tackled in a socially sustainable way, pension reform need not be as tortuous a 
process as it has been over the last decades. If policymakers agree on the aims they 
want their pension systems to achieve, and have the good sense to get political 
acceptance or at least make sure citizens are well informed of these aims, they will be 
able to set in place reforms that stand the test of time. The framework developed in 
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this research presents one way in which policymakers can determine how best to 
structure their reforms. It shows the interaction between the achievement of system 
goals and pressure on system constraints, and is able to shed light on the effects of 
reforms on all groups of society. Pension systems have proven to be one of the most 
treasured social constructs of the twentieth century. There is little reason why they 
should not remain so also during the twenty-first century, if policymakers make the 
necessary modifications to assure their social sustainability. 
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